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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-Whole Record Review and the
Real Story Behind Walck v. City of Albuquerque
I.

INTRODUCTION

Current New Mexico law pertaining to whole record judicial review
of administrative agency proceedings has been shaped and interpreted
through the case law of the past decade.' Although both district and2
appellate courts sit in technically appellate postures to agency decisions,
it is the district court that has first review. The district court applies
and tests the established evidentiary standards and it is at this level that
these standards have the strongest impact. The standards make theoretical
sense, but are not simple to apply because the district court often su-

perimposes an external framework, a legal standard, within which the
review standards must remain. 3
This article explains the current status of judicial review of administrative proceedings in New Mexico as it relates to the substantial evidence
rule and the legal residuum rule. Furthermore, it will use the factual
background of a recent New Mexico case involving the discriminatory

termination of employment of a police officer, Walck v. City of Albuquerque,4 to illustrate the tension that develops between the district
court and the administrative agency when the evidentiary rules clash with
the legal standard the agency does not wish to follow.
II. PRELIMINARY CASE BACKGROUND
In April 1986, Officer Alfred W. Walck was terminated from the

Albuquerque Police Department ("APD") following an internal affairs
investigation.' After an evidentiary hearing on the matter, the city Personnel Board upheld his termination on August 4, 1986,6 concluding that

1. See Michael B. Browde, Substantial Evidence Reconsidered: The Post-Duke City Difficulties
and Some Suggestions for Their Resolutions, 18 N.M. L. Rv. 525, 536 (1988).
2. See Groendyke Transport, Inc. v. New Mexico State Corp. Comm'n, 101 N.M. 470, 476,
684 P.2d 1135, 1141 (1984).
3. Appellate courts, on the other hand, review the lower courts' decisions, and consequently
are removed from direct contact with the agency. Also, appellate courts "give substantial deference
to the trial court's judgment." Jeffrey Croasdell 8 Andrew McGuire, Appellate Procedure, 22 N.M.
L. REv. 653 (1992) (citing Clovis Nat'l Bank v. Harmon, 102 N.M. 166, 692 P.2d 1315 (1984)).
4. 113 N.M. 533, 828 P.2d 966 (Ct. App. 1992).
5. The following statements of facts are taken from the Walck case unless otherwise cited.
6. The City of Albuquerque Revised Ordinances of 1974 (revised 7/1/92), describes the function
of the Personnel Board (Art IX, Sec. 2-9-5(B)): "The Personnel Board shall render a decision upon
the appeal of classified employees of the City concerning certain grievances as provided in Section
25 of this Ordinance." Walck was required to follow the Grievance Resolution Procedure (Art IX,
Sec. 2-9-25) in appealing his termination. The Standard Operating Procedure Manual ("SOP manual")
of the APD, section 1-09-5, states that "[plersonnel are required to familiarize themselves with the
procedures as outlined in the City Merit System Ordinance." The Merit System is described in Art
IX, section 2-9-1 of the City of Albuquerque Revised Ordinances and states that "[i]n accordance
with Article X of the Charter of the City of Albuquerque, there is hereby established a merit system
governing the hiring, promotion and discharge of employees and providing for the general regulation
of employees .... ").
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Walck had "engaged in conduct unbecoming an officer" in violation of
Standard Operating Procedure ("SOP") section 1-19-2,1 and that he had
failed to answer truthfully questions relating to the investigation in violation of SOP section 1-19-31.8

The incident which gave rise to the charges against Officer Walck
involved an altercation between Wack and his wife, Belinda, from whom
he had recently separated. Walck was aware that his estranged wife was

having an affair with Dennis South. 9 While off-duty, Walck drove his
personal vehicle to South's house in Rio Rancho. He observed Belinda

preparing to leave for work in her car, which was parked in the garage.
It is undisputed that he twice struck his estranged wife's car with his
own, after which the stories diverge.
Walck stated that he hit Belinda's car by mistake in an attempt to
back up, that he shifted into park, that he placed his gun on his belt,

and that he waited for two Rio Rancho public safety officers to arrive.
Upon the arrival of the first officer, James Wilson, Walck identified

himself as an Albuquerque police officer and handed over his gun.' 0 He
continued that he had finally caught his estranged wife "sleeping around,"
and requested that Wilson write him a "good report." Walck was contesting child custody at the time." Belinda Walck's testimony lent a
different tenor to the occurrence. She stated that Walck repeatedly and
angrily hit her Datsun, causing damage not only to the car bumper but
to appliances which were directly in front of her car in the garage. 2 She
that he "kicked
testified that she feared Walck would use his gun ' and
3

her once in the groin area and called her names.'
South supported Belinda's testimony.

4

After the incident, South con-

tacted Sergeant William Weil in Internal Affairs, who started the investigation leading to Walck's termination.

5

Walck denied that he kicked

7. This section is now 1-04-1(F)(G) of the "Personnel Code of Conduct" in the SOP manual
of the APD (effective 7/10/92), and it states that law enforcement officers "shall conduct themselves,
both on and off duty, in such a manner as to reflect most favorably on the Department. Conduct
unbecoming an officer or employee shall include that which brings the Department into disrepute
or impairs the operation or efficiency of the Department."
8. This is now section 1-04-4(X) under "General Orders" of the "Personnel Code of Conduct"
in the SOP manual of the APD (effective 7/10/92), and it states that law enforcement officers
"shall truthfully answer all questions specifically directed and narrowly related to the scope of
employment and operations of the Department which may be asked of them."
9. Testimony from both Walck and South shows that the two couples met for the first time
several months prior to the incident to engage in "swapping." Transcript of Personnel Board Hearing
at RP81, 132, Walck v. City of Albuquerque, 113 N.M. 533, 828 P.2d 966 (Ct. App. 1992) (No.
11736). By the time of the Personnel Board Hearing, Belinda Walck married Dennis South. Id. at
RP54-55. Transcripts and exhibits from the District Court's hearings appear in the Record Proper
and will be cited as "RP."
10. Id. at RP94-97.
11. Id. at RP41.
12. Id. at RP56.
13. Id. at RP57 and RP58.
14. Dennis South stated that Walck "rammed the back of (Belinda's] car," and "jammed it
into the washing machine . . . ." Id. at RP79. He also testified that at the time Walck called him
prior to the incident to tell him to stop seeing Belinda, the relationship was not sexual. Id. at
RP87.
15. South also filed a complaint against Walck for criminal damages. Id. at RP79.
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Belinda, that he intentionally rammed her car, and that he brandished
his gun.' 6 The Personnel Board concluded from these facts that Walck's
behavior "constituted conduct unbecoming an officer" in violation of
SOP Section 1-19-2.17 It also found that Walck was untruthful in his
responses "to questions about his vehicle striking Belinda Walck's vehicle,
'8
...[and] when asked if he called her back after the incident occurred.'
These findings were sufficient to permit the Personnel Board to uphold
the APD's decision to terminate Officer Walck. Walck appealed his
termination.
III.

STANDARDS FOR WHOLE RECORD REVIEW

The principles of whole record review were developed by appellate
courts to help agencies and district courts maintain a proper mutual
deference and delicate balance of power.' 9 The substantial evidence rule,
the legal residuum rule, and second-tier review give reviewing courts some
20
check over decisions which agencies make with complete autonomy.
A.

Substantial Evidence Within Whole Record Review

1. Background
2
In the absence of any statutory standard for administrative review, '
New Mexico appellate courts review administrative findings of fact using
the rule established in Duke City Lumber v. New Mexico Environmental
Improvement Board: "if there is substantial evidence in the record to
support a finding, the reviewing court is bound thereby.' '22 Substantial
evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion, ' 23 or "if it is of a type
commonly relied upon by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of
their affairs."2

16. Id. at RP127 and RP124.
17. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by Personnel Board at RP4-6, Walck v. City of
Albuquerque, 113 N.M. 533, 828 P.2d 966 (Ct. App. 1992) (No. 11736).
18. Id. at RP5.
19. The existence of administrative agencies helps increase the efficiency of the judicial system;
they were "created, in part, to avoid some of the delays and technicalities of judicial procedures."
Albert E. Utton, The Use of the Substantial Evidence Rule to Review Administrative Proceedings,
10 N.M. L. REV. 103, 110 (1979).
20. For a discussion of second-tier review, see infra notes 89-97 and accompanying text.
21. New Mexico's Administrative Procedures Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-8-1 to -25 (Repl.
Pamp. 1988), is only used as a "general guideline" for the resolution of administrative law questions.
Groendyke Transport v. New Mexico State Corp. Comm'n, 101 N.M. 470, 476, 684 P.2d 1135,
1141 (1984); see also Michael B. Browde, Administrative Law, 12 N.M. L. REv. 1, 57 (1982).
22. 101 N.M. 291, 294, 681 P.2d 717, 720 (1984).
23. Rinker v. State Corp. Comm'n, 84 N.M. 626, 627, 506 P.2d 783, 784 (1973) (citation
omitted).
24. Duke City, 101 N.M. at 295, 681 P.2d at 721 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-8-11(a) (Repl.
Pamp. 1978)).
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New Mexico has25 used substantial evidence within a whole record concept
since Duke City:
New Mexico [now] uses a standard of review which is 'limited to
determining whether the agency acted within the scope of its authority,
whether the order was supported by substantial evidence, whether the
decision was made fraudulently, arbitrarily or capriciously, and whether
there was an abuse of discretion or show26 of bias by the agency,'
...[employing) . . . whole record review.

Duke City "expressly modif[ied]" the substantial evidence rule for New
Mexico by holding that it must be applied to the entire record. Segments
of the record may not be ignored in applying the rule, 27 although the
change still affords administrative agencies considerable deference with
the "light most favorable" requirement. 28 The new rule requires that the
''reviewing court must now look at evidence which is contrary to the
'29
agency's finding instead of disregarding it as before."
2. The On-Balance Approach in Whole Record Review
Use of substantial evidence within a whole record structure provides
more balance between reviewing courts and agency proceedings, but it
is not so clear that the "light most favorable to the decision" standard
should remain.30 The alternative "of viewing-all-the-evidence-to-see-if-on-

balance-it-supports-the-decision"'

offers a more neutral approach to the

review process. The court would still be precluded from substituting its
own findings for those of the agency unless the "agency's findings were
not supported by substantial evidence." '3 2 The less deferential approach
of viewing the evidence entirely on balance has been used in decisions
following Duke City, and in very recent cases 3 For example, the court

25. Before Duke City, New Mexico courts viewed the evidence in "the light most favorable [to
the agency] to support the findings," and limited their review to that evidence which supported
the agency decision, thereby allowing the agency to create its own maximum threshold of review
for the courts to accept-or not. Duke City, 101 N.M. at 294, 681 P.2d at 721 (citing N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 12-8-11(a) (Repl. Pamp. 1978)). This limited record review allowed "accepting part of the
.evidence and totally disregarding other convincing evidence in the record considered as a whole,"
thus according the agency an obvious and overwhelming deference. Id. at 294, 681 P.2d at 720
(citations omitted). The Duke City court allowed that, in certain cases, it was proper to "engag[e]
in a review of the record as a whole," as opposed to limiting its review strictly to substantial
evidence submitted by the agency. Id. at 293, 681 P.2d at 719 (citations omitted).
26. Walck, 113 N.M. at 535, 828 P.2d at 968 (citing In re Mountain Bell, 109 N.M. 504, 505,
787 P.2d 423, 424 (1990)) (emphasis added).
27. Duke City, 101 N.M. at 294, 681 P.2d at 720.
28. Id.
29. Trujillo v. Employment Security Dep't, 105 N.M. 467, 469, 734 P.2d 245, 247 (Ct. App.
1987).
30. For a comprehensive overview of the post-Duke City decisions describing the struggle to
clarify how the substantial evidence in whole record review standard should be applied, see Browde,
supra note 1, at 535-40.
31. Id. at 535.
32. Id. at 541 (citing N.M. Human Services Dep't. v. Garcia, 94 N.M. 175, 177, 608 P.2d 151,
153 (1980)).
33. Id. at 535-40.
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in Cibola Energy Corp. v. Roselli,3 4 stated that the reviewing court must
decide "whether, on balance, the agency's decision was supported by
substantial evidence."" Even so, the "light most favorable" approach
continues to be used.
In Evans v. Valley Diesel,3 6 the supreme court took pains to clarify
its previous holding as set forth in National Council
on Compensation
37
Insurance v. New Mexico State Corp. Commission:
While 'all evidence ... will be viewed in the light most favorable
to the agency's decision[,] [t]his would ... not preclude the court
from setting aside the agency decision when it cannot conscientiously
say that the evidence supporting the decision is substantial, when
viewed in the light that the whole record furnishes.' 8
A possible way to reconcile this co-existing "duality" of standards is to
offer that the "light most favorable" approach be used to "uphold
agency decisions which do not trammel fundamental personal rights . ..
while reserving the 'on balance' line to overturn those decisions which
do touch upon personal, fundamental rights, or which are arrived at
through suspect process.'' 39
To illustrate, In re Mountain Bell4 involved a denial by the New
Mexico Corporation Commission of a telephone company's petition for
detariffing public and semi-public services. No personal rights were involved, and the court made use of the "light most favorable" standard
instituted in Duke City.4' Akel v. New Mexico Human Services Department, 42 however, involved eligibility for disability benefits-rights which
may be characterized as more fundamental and personal. Here the court
used the on-balance approach. 43 This use of the substantial evidence rule
within a whole record context allows the court considerable flexibility
within individual cases.
B.

The Legal Residuum Rule
The formation of the record itself is subject to certain standards. In
New Mexico, testimony in the record must have passed the "legal residuum" threshold, so that in order to meet "New Mexico's review
standard of 'substantial evidence,' an administrative record must contain

34. 105 N.M. 774, 737 P.2d 555 (Ct. App. 1987).
35. Id. at 776, 737 P.2d at 557; see also Urioste v. Sideris, 107 N.M. 733, 738, 764 P.2d 504,
509 (Ct. App. 1988).
36. 111 N.M. 556, 807 P.2d 740 (1991) (upholding decision by workers' compensation judge to
award benefits to worker).
37. 107 N.M. 278, 282, 756 P.2d 558, 562 (1988).
38. Evans, 111 N.M. at 559, 807 P.2d at 743 (citation omitted); see also Watson v. Town
Council of Bernalillo, 111 N.M. 374, 377, 805 P.2d 641, 644 (Ct. App. 1991).
39. Browde, supra note 1, at 539.
40. 109 N.M. 504, 5054)6, 787 P.2d 423, 423-24 (1990).
41. Id.
42. 106 N.M. 741, 742, 749 P.2d 1120, 1121 (Ct. App. 1987).
43. Id.
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within it at least some evidence which is legally competent in the courts. "
"[A] reviewing court [must] set aside an administrative finding unless
the finding is supported by evidence which would be admissible in a jury
45
trial."
It has been suggested that, because the legal residuum requirement
curtails the flexibility of administrative proceedings,"4 it would be better
if the courts, "rather than focusing on rules of admissibility (as in the
legal residuum rule), focused on what evidence may be relied on once
admitted-that is, what evidence has probative value." 47
The legal residuum rule, however, is not always employed.4 One
example of an alternative standard that commonly occurs at administrative
hearings is unsworn citizen testimony.4 9 In deciding when to use the legal
residuum rule, the best guide may be that which is also used when
choosing between standards of substantial evidence.50 When "limited to
those circumstances where important personalrights are involved [because]
the added formality [of the residuum rule] . . . properly serves to insure
of those important rights."'"
that more attention is paid to the protection
2
guide.
this
followed
has
law
Case
C. "Conduct Unbecoming An Officer:" The Legal Standard
The Personnel Board's determination against Walck rested on allegations
that Walck had violated two department regulations. Therefore, a judicial
review of the Board's decision would require not only a determination
of whether the evidence the Board relied on constituted substantial evidence but whether the regulation was in fact violated. The latter requirement depended on regulatory interpretation as well as legal conclusions.
The appeal process which ensued after Walck's termination involved
careful consideration of all the evidence collected below during the agency
deliberations. The district court, however, repeatedly reminded the agency
of the parameters within which the allegations were made, namely, the
meaning and interpretations of the two SOP regulations.5"

44. Utton, supra note 19, at 110.
45. Trujillo v. Employment Sec. Comm'n of New Mexico, 94 N.M. 343, 344, 610 P.2d 747,
748 (1980) (citation omitted); see also Duke City Lumber v. New Mexico Env'l Improvement Bd.,
101 N.M. 291, 295, 681 P.2d 717, 721 (1984).
46. See Utton, supra note 19, at 112.
47. Id.
48. See Browde, supra note 1, at 534.
49. In Duke City, citizen testimony addressed the issue of the hazardous effects of wood-burning
smoke coming from a sawmill, but was not considered admissible. See Browde, supra note 1, at
556 n. 170.
50. See Browde, supra note I and accompanying text.
51. Browde, supra note 1, at 534-35.
52. Duke City, 101 N.M. at 295, 681 P.2d at 721 (affirming decision by appeals court which
upheld rejection of emissions variance by Environmental Improvement Board) (citation omitted);
cf. Trujillo, 94 N.M. at 344, 610 P.2d at 748 (1980) (reversing district and appeals courts' rejection
of worker's unemployment compensation benefits based on issue being one of "substantial right").
53. The discussion to follow will look at the interplay between the Personnel Board and the
District Court regarding this aspect.
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Police officers are generally answerable for their off-duty conduct,
including their "private" lives, when considering a possible violation of
"conduct unbecoming an officer." Case law consensus is that police
officers are held to a "higher standard. '5 4 A court's definition of the
off-duty facet provides a legal standard for the agency in weighing the
evidence."
The interpretation of a regulation provides another kind of legal standard for an agency to follow. In order to obtain conclusions of law
from its findings of fact, the agency's findings must fit within the
framework of the interpretation.
The Personnel Board failed to stay within this framework throughout
dismissal of its decision by
the review process, leading to the ultimate
6
the New Mexico Court of Appeals.
IV.

WALCK'S APPEAL FROM HIS TERMINATION

Walck petitioned the district court for writ of certiorari.57 The court
based its review on the whole record,58 employing the usual substantial
evidence and legal residuum standards. Even after two remands the
Personnel Board was unable to meet these standards; more critically, it
was bound to fail as a matter of law because its decision fell short of
the legal standards set up by the SOP regulations.
Round One: To the District Court and Back
Walck petitioned the district court to review the case, claiming that:
1) certain exculpatory evidence was "excluded by the Board in its refusal
to hear [two] witnesses;" 2) that there was a lack of evidence to show
that the efficiency of the APD was "undermined or impaired" by Walck's
conduct; and 3) that the actions of the Personnel Board were "arbitrary,
capricious and unlawful, and not supported by substantial evidence." 5 9
The barring of the two witnesses' testimony was particularly critical in
shaping the Personnel Board's decision, as Walck contradicted most of
A.

54. Faust v. Police Civil Service Comm'n of Bor. of State College Pa. Commonwealth, 347
A.2d 765, 768 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975). Faust was one of the cases relied on by the City of
Albuquerque in its appeal against Walck. Walck, 113 N.M. at 535, 828 P.2d at 968.
55. A broad construction of "off-duty" would seem to allow no limits in considering the private
areas of an off-duty officer's life. The district court in Walck's case more specifically defined the
parameters of "off-duty," and, as shall be seen limited the ability of the Personnel Board to find
that Walck had violated either of the SOP sections.
56. Walck, 133 N.M. at 536, 828 P.2d at 969.
57. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at RP2, Walck v. City of Albuquerque, 113 N.M. 533, 828
P.2d 966 (Ct. App. 1992) (No. CV86-08612). The New Mexico District Court has "appellate
jurisdiction in all cases originating in inferior courts and tribunals in their respective districts, and
supervisory control over the same." N.M. CONST. ART. VI, § 13.
58. Walck, 113 N.M. at 533-34, 828 P.2d at 966-67.
59. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at RP2, Walck v. City of Albuquerque, 113 N.M. 533, 828
P.2d 966 (Ct. App. 1992) (No. CV86-08612).
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Belinda Walck's testimony 0 For the next two years, the Personnel Board
and the district court 6volleyed the case back and forth, culminating in
Walck's reinstatement. '
On its first hearing, the district court partially remanded the case back

to the Board for the limited purpose of recusal of a Board member. 62

On rehearing, the Personnel Board conceded that not only was bias
probable, but that the Board member should have brought the existence

of his acquaintance with Belinda to the Board's attention earlier.63 With
this narrow issue decided, the case was returned to the district court for
a review of the other issues in Walck's petition. In its final opinion,6

the district court found that facts concerning material issues must be
supported by substantial evidence, and that
there was lack of substantial
6
evidence to uphold Walck's termination.

First, the city used South's filing of a criminal complaint and an
opening statement by the Assistant City Attorney alluding to a nolo
contendere plea by Walck to support a finding of criminal behavior,
which was used to infer conduct unbecoming a police officer. The court
found this insufficient under the principle of substantial evidence as well
as legal residuum." Second, facts underlying Walck's actions that day,
the credibility issue, and proof of untruthfulness were all not supported
by substantial evidence. 67 The court further held that these facts, in turn,
''must support logically related conclusions of law.''" As a matter of
law, these facts could not support the "conclusion that [Walck's] behavior
... reflected unfavorably on APD or constituted conduct unbecoming

an officer."

69

While the court felt that off-duty conduct of a police

60. Debbie Walck, Brenda Walck's daughter, would have testified that her mother "had taken
Debbie's money;" that her mother "had lied to her physician in order to obtain prescription
medicine;" and that her mother "habitually lied, including using family illness and death as excuses
to miss work, when there was in fact no family illness or death." Richard Style, the second witness,
would have offered proof "to the effect that Dennis South had represented himself as a law
enforcement officer," although "he admitted that he had never been a law enforcement officer."
Memorandum Brief in Support of Petitioner's Writ of Certiorari at RP60, Walck v. City of
Albuquerque, 113 N.M. 533, 828 P.2d 966 (Ct. App. 1992) (No. CV86-08612).
61. The Personnel Board and the City of Albuquerque appealed the district court's decision not
to uphold Walck's termination to the court of appeals, which affirmed the lower court's decision.
Walck v. City of Albuquerque, 113 N.M. 533, 828 P.2d 966 (Ct. App. 1992).
.62. Order for Remand at RPI52, Walck v. City of Albuquerque, 113 N.M. 533, 828 P.2d 966
(Ct. App. 1992) (No. CV86-08612). Walck had learned that one of the Board members had been
acquainted with Belinda during the time of the Board's decision. Both Bill Watson and Belinda
Walck were Team Father and Team Mother, respectively, for their sons' little league team.
63. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by Personnel Board at RP183, Walck v. City of
Albuquerque, 113 N.M. 533, 828 P.2d 966 (Ct. App. 1992) (No. 11736).
64. Opinion and Final Judgment at RPI84, Walck v. City of Albuquerque, 113 N.M. 533, 828
P.2d 966 (Ct. App. 1992) (No. CV86-08612). This is now the second remand made to the Board.
65. Id. at RP189.
66. Id.
67. Evidence of Wack's untruthfulness was based completely on the testimony of Sergeant
William Weiland of Internal Affairs for APD. Sergeant Weiland felt that Walck was being equivocal
about whether or not he had called Belinda after the incident. Personnel Board Hearing at RP9l,
Walck v. City of Albuquerque, 113 N.M. 533, 828 P.2d 966 (Ct. App. 1992) (No. CV86-08612).
68. District Court's Dec. 1987 Opinion at RP189, Walck v. City of Albuquerque, 113 N.M.
533, 828 P.2d 966 (Ct. App. 1992) (No. CV86-08612).
69. Id. at RP189-190.
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officer does relate to the performance of his duties "insofar as it influences
the public opinion," the effect of the behavior on the "public perception"
must "constitute a cause related to employment. '7 ° The court vacated
Walck's termination and remanded the case to the Board for a rehearing
on all issues. 7'
The district court then offered the Board a clear direction of law by
narrowing and specifying the parameters of the two regulations Walck
was charged with violating. The regulation involving conduct unbecoming
an officer would include off-duty behavior only when public opinion was
affected in a way that was connected to employment. The regulation
directing an officer to answer all questions truthfully would apply only
to questions "specifically directed and narrowly related to the scope of

employment and operations of the Department

....

",72

The Board had

two choices at this point: it could dispose of the case, or come back
with new evidence.
The court's ruling was a clear message that, as things presently stood
with the case, the evidence articulated in the Board's findings of fact
was not enough to uphold Walck's termination. The Board's decision
was doomed to reversal. Even new evidence would be bound within the
parameters defined by the regulations.
Round Two: After the Second Remand
Notwithstanding the court's directive, the Board upheld Walck's termination on rehearing after this second remand, without offering any
new evidence. 73 Not surprisingly, the district court granted Walck's petition
to review the case a second time, finding that the Personnel Board "failed
to comply with [the court's] Order on remand." ' 74 The court found that
there was not substantial evidence underlying criminal charges against
Walck nor was there substantial evidence of conduct unbecoming an
officer or conduct that would reflect unfavorably on the police department. 75 Furthermore, there was no evidence that [Walck's] conduct
was "reasonably related to the Department, its reputation or operation,"
and that there was not sufficient evidence nor a legal residuum of evidence
to "support the conclusion [that Walck was untruthful]. ' 76 The court
held that the Board's conclusion that Walck violated section 1-19-2 was
without substantial evidence and therefore was incorrect as a matter of
B.

70. Id. at RP192.
71. Id. It is unclear why the court waited for the Board's decision about the recusal before
sending it back for a rehearing on all issues. One possibility is that because Walck did not find
out about Bill Watson's acquaintance with Belinda until after his petition was filed, and that because
the issue was not included in his brief for writ of certiorari, the court treated it separately.
72. Id. at RPI90-91.
73. Personnel Board's New Findings of Fact and Conclusions at RP211, Walck v. City of
Albuquerque, 113 N.M. 533, 828 P.2d 966, (Ct. App. 1992) (No. 11736).
74. Order and Writ of Certiorari at RP214, Walck v. City of Albuquerque, 113 N.M. 533, 828
P.2d 966 (Ct. App. 1992) (No. CV86-08612).
75. Id.
76. Id.
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law.77 The court also found that the Board's conclusion that Walck had
violated section 1-19-31 was incorrect as a matter of law because the
Board had "improperly considered and applied [SOP] section 1-19-31 to
[the] case." ' 7 Moreover, the questions asked of Walck were found not
to be "specifically directed and narrowly related to the scope of employment and operations of the Department. ' 79 The court ordered a
reversal of the Board's decision, and a remand with directions to reinstate
Walck with full retroactive pay and benefits. 8°
The Personnel Board lost on two levels. On one level, it failed the
substantial evidence and legal residuum rule thresholds. The court treated
the Board's decision with an "on balance" rather than a "light most
favorable" approach. Evidence to the contrary of the Personnel Board's
decision was not only considered, but weighed equally (not less favorably)
with evidence supporting the decision. For example, while the Board
found that Walck was "untruthful" about a call to Belinda after the
accident telling her he had "finally caught her,""' the court found Walck's
equivocations were not necessarily untruthful.8 2 The court evenly balanced
the Board's vague feelings of untruthfulness 3 with testimony from Belinda
and Dennis South. Similarly, the Board found that Walck's conduct
toward his estranged wife was substantial enough to support termination,
but the court looked at the rest of the record8 and held to the contrary.85
The court strongly relied on the legal residuum rule in striking at the
Board's decision concerning Walck's "untruthfulness." The court found
that there was lacking a "legal residuum of evidence in the record to
support the conclusion [that Walck was being untruthful in the Internal

77. Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at RP238-39, Walck v. City of Albuquerque,
113 N.M. 533, 828 P.2d 966 (Ct. App. 1992) (No. CV86-08612).
78. Id. at RP240.
79. Id. at RP239.
80. Id. at RP240. This was the district court's third remand to the Board.
81. Personnel Board Hearing at RP38, 48, Walck v. City of Albuquerque, 113 N.M. 533, 828
P.2d 966 (Ct. App. 1992) (No. 11736).
82. District Court's June 1989 Opinion at 238-39, Walck v. City of Albuquerque, 113 N.M.
533, 828 P.2d 966 (Ct. App. 1992) (No. CV86-08612). The court's finding was not based on its
own construction of the facts but rather on the insufficiency of facts necessary to support the
agency's construction.
83. Personnel Board Hearing at RP93, Walck v. City of Albuquerque, 113 N.M. 533, 828 P.2d
966 (Ct. App. 1992) (No. 11736).
84. The court was probably aware the Personnel Board might have been following its own
agenda in deciding on termination, judging from some of the testimony at the Personnel Board
Hearing. There were references to "conflicts" with administration, as well as to previous lawsuits
filed by Walck against the department. Id. at RP36-37. In addition, police union representative
Officer Mark Bradley testified that Walck was unfairly treated in the disciplinary process, suggesting
that Walck was not adequately informed of the nature of the interrogation, as required under
section 20 of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at RPI10-11. He further testified that he
knew of the disposition of another domestic violence situation which resulted in a one-day suspension,
not a termination. Id. at RPI14.
85. The court held that "[e]ven after remand, the Board completely failed to make a factual
finding on the disputed issues of whether [Walck] kicked his ex-wife or whether he brandished his
weapon." Memo to Counsel from Sitterly, J. at RP219, Walck v. City of Albuquerque, 113 N.M.
533, 828 P.2d 966 (Ct. App. 1992) (No. CV86-08612).
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Affairs investigation]. '8 6 The legal residuum rule requires more than8 7 the
conclusion of a third person which the Board offered as evidence.
On a second level, the Board lost because it neglected the importance
of the legal standards imposed by the regulations themselves. Even if
the Board had unearthed new evidence following the district court's second
remand, it is doubtful that the court's 1989 opinion would have had a
different result. In fact, it would not have mattered that Walck had
intentionally rammed his estranged wife's car as the connection between
his conduct and his employment was too tenuous to support a violation,
considering the narrow scope given to the regulation by the court. It
also would not have mattered if Walck actually was untruthful in his
answers during the investigation, if none of the questions were related
to his employment.
V.

THE CITY'S APPEAL

The city appealed the district court's June 1989 reversal of the Board's
decision to the New Mexico Court of Appeals. 88 Separate standards exist
for the second-tier of judicial review of agency proceedings at the appellate
court level, although there has been some confusion about the extent
and nature of the review process.
Second-Tier Review
The reviewing court can make an independent finding only after a
showing of a lack of substantial evidence to support the agency's decision. 89 Once a lack of substantial evidence is shown, however, the
question remains whether the court should set aside the agency's decision
and enter its own finding, or whether it should remand it to allow the
agency "to engage in better fact-finding the second time around."' 9
The adoption of whole record review appears to have authorized independent findings, because the "reviewing court may act on other
convincing evidence in the record and may make its own findings based
thereon." 9' In Watson v. Town Council of Bernalillo,92 however, the

A.

86. District Court's June 1989 Opinion at RP239, Walck v. City of Albuquerque, 113 N.M.
533, 828 P.2d 966 (Ct. App. 1992) (No. CV86-08612).
87. Id. The "third person" was Sgt. W.E. Weiland, Internal Affairs Officer for the APD.
Weiland based his allegations that Walck was being untruthful on the fact that Walck denied kicking
his ex-wife, but the injury "required medical attention." Personnel Board Hearing at RP90-91,
Walck v. City of Albuquerque, 113 N.M. 533, 828 P.2d 966 (Ct. App. 1992) (No. 11736). The
transcript, however, contains no conclusive support for Weiland's statement concerning the "required
medical attention."
88. Walck v. City of Albuquerque, 113 N.M. 533, 828 P.2d 966 (Ct. App. 1992).
89. See Browde, supra note 1, at 544.
90. Id. at 544-45.
91. Trujillo v. Employment Security Dept., 105 N.M. 467, 469, 734 P.2d 245, 247 (Ct. App.
1987) (citation omitted); see also Cibola Energy Corp. v. Roselli, 105 N.M. 774, 777, 737 P.2d
555, 558 (Ct. App. 1987) ("[T]he whole record review standard allows 'independent findings by
the reviewing court reaching a contrary result from that of the administrative agency ... where
the decision of the . . . agency is not supported by substantial evidence."') (citation omitted).
92. 111 N.M. 374, 376, 805 P.2d 641, 643 (Ct. App. 1991).
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court "invite[d] the supreme court to consider [limiting review of agency
fact-finding] at the second judicial tier" in order to preclude the appellant
from getting the "benefit of a de novo appellate review at each judicial
level. " 93

The supreme court accepted the invitation in Evans v. Valley Diesel,
narrowing the circumstances under which independent findings could be
made at the second-tier. In Evans, the court of appeals reversed the trial

court's affirmation of an award of benefits by a workers' compensation
judge. The supreme court held that the court of appeals had gone beyond

"the admittedly sometimes fine line between reviewing [I and rewriting"
the disposition of the agency. 95 The appeals court is not free to construe
the record differently from the lower court, but should confine its independent findings to situations "when the trial court's findings are

contrary to undisputed evidence in the record ....

'"96

Evans clarified

the parameters for second-tier review by applying the requisite whole
record standard of review and more critically, by also reviewing "the
97
correctness of the court of appeals' opinion."
B.

The Appellate Court's Decision
By the time the Walck case reached the second tier of review, the
whole record had already been through several rounds of remands, and
the appellate court deemed it sufficient to base its decision on the findings

of the district court within a whole record review of the agency's decision,
rather than a trial de novo. 98
The appellate court reviewed the record only to ascertain whether or
not the district court applied the "relevant standard of review."9 The
court deferred to the district court's reasoning, finding insubstantial

evidence for Walck's termination.'0 Walck's termination, the court found,
could not be sustained because the Personnel Board "failed to comply
with the district court's directive to determine whether [section 1-19-31,
pertaining to untruthfulness] applies to this case."'' 1 Although the ap-

pellate court examined evidence from the whole record, 0 2 it considered
the decision in light of the lower court's reasoning and construction of

93. Id.; see also Browde, supra note 1, at 544-49, 557-58.
94. 111 N.M. 557, 558-59, 807 P.2d 740, 741-42 (1991).
95. Id. at 559, 807 P.2d at 742.
96. Id. (citing Tallman v. Arkansas Best Freight, 108 N.M. 124, 129-30, 767 P.2d 363, 368-69
(Ct. App. 1988)). In Evans, a worker was injured when the battery in his vehicle, which he stored
on his employer's premises, blew up in his face. Both the workers' compensation judge and the
trial court construed the record to mean that Evans was on his employer's premises during the
course of his employment, since Evans customarily locked up after storing his vehicle. The court
of appeals, however, construed the record to mean that Evans was on his employer's premises for
personal reasons not related to his employment. Id.
97. Id. at 558-59, 807 P.2d at 741-42; see also Croasdell & McGuire, supra note 3, at 658.
98. Walck, 113 N.M. at 535, 828 P.2d .at 968.
99. Browde, supra note 1, at 558.
100. Walck, 113 N.M. at 534, 536, 828 P.2d at 967, 969.
101. Id. at 537, 828 P.2d at 970.
102. "A summary of the pertinent parts of the record is necessary to explain our result." Id.
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the facts in the case. On this second-tier of review, the court offered
no independent finding, but instead limited itself to "insuring that the
first court [did] its job in reviewing the agency."' 0 3 The appellate court
kept in line with the test for second-tier review of the whole record as
defined in Evans,1°4 by considering "whether there [was] substantial evidence to support the judgment of the fact finder, not whether there is
evidence to support an alternative result."'' 5
Appellate review in the Walck case yielded an interesting twist. After
careful adherence to a limited second-tier review, and after accepting the
district court's findings of fact as true, the appellate court decided that,
as a matter of law, the facts could not support Walck's termination. It7
opined that Walck's behavior,10 as well as questions asked by the Board,
were outside the scope of sections 1-19-2 and 1-19-31. It is ironic, that,
although the district court clarified the legal standards to be followed
in applying the regulations, the Board's own construction of one regulation
prevented the Board from prevailing as a matter of law.101
VI.

CONCLUSION

Judicial review of administrative agency proceedings is based on evidentiary standards which allow the agency autonomy and flexibility. These
rules of substantial evidence and legal residuum, however, all take place
in the context of legal standards. In the Walck case, the legal standards
rested on the interpretation and scope given to the SOP regulations,
sections 1-19-2 and 1-19-31. The Board apparently lost sight of, or chose
to ignore, the boundaries created by these legal standards. It failed to
realize that findings of fact will lead to the desired conclusions of law
only when such findings satisfy these standards. The "conduct unbecoming
an officer" should have had some connection to employment, even when
it influences public perception, and should actually, not potentially, bring
the department into disrepute. The questions asked of Officer Walck
during the investigation should have been "narrowly related" to employment, regardless of how untruthful his responses were.
The Walck case portrays the complexity of whole record review. The
standards of substantial evidence and legal residuum represent just one

103. See Browde, supra note 1, at 557.
104. Evans, Il1 N.M. at 558, 807 P.2d at 742.
105. Id. (citation omitted).
106. Walck, 113 N.M. at 536, 828 P.2d at 969.
107. Id.
108. Section 1-19-2 states that the conduct must "reflect unfavorably" on the APD. The appellate
court noted that although "some jurisdictions have defined conduct unbecoming an officer to include
conduct which tends to . . . bring the department into disrepute, the personnel board did not rely
on such a construction in this case." Walck, 113 N.M. at 536, 828 P.2d at 969. The language of
the New Mexico regulation indicates that the conduct in question must actually bring the department
into disrepute. Id. The city relied on two Pennsylvania cases involving off-duty adulterous conduct
by police officers, including Fabio v. Civil Service Comm'n, 414 A.2d 82 (Pa. 1980).
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level of the review process. At the same time, agencies and courts must
be aware of the legal standards issuing from regulations and statutes.
PHYLLIS AMATO

